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THE NEW REVOLVING DOOR
Michael P. Vandenbergh,t Jonathan M. Gilligan,tt and Haley
Feuermanttt
ABSTRACT

This Article demonstrates that a new revolving door is emerging
between environmental-advocacy groups and the private sector. Since
the birth of the modern regulatory state, scholars have raised concerns
that the revolving door between corporations and government agencies
could induce government officials to pursue corporate interests rather
than the public interest. The legal and political-science literatures have
identified several benefits that may arise from the revolving door, but
the thrust of the scholarship to date has emphasized the potential
harms. Using several data sources, we demonstrate that as the private
sector has begun to play an increasing role in environmental governance
in recent years, a new revolving door has emerged between
environmental-advocacy
groups and corporations, institutional
investment firms, and private equity firms. We demonstrate that this
new revolving door is surprisingly common, and we examine the
implications for the future of public and private environmental
governance. Although this new revolving door creates new risks, we
argue that it may turn on its head the central concern about the
revolving door: The movement of environmental advocates into
corporate management positions may play the role of greening
corporate behavior and may accelerate the development of private
environmental initiatives. We focus on the movement of employees in
the environmental area a new green revolving door but we suggest
that this new revolving door also may be emerging in labor, health and
safety, and other regulatory areas.
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INTRODUCTION

Private equity firms have been criticized for pursuing profits at the
expense of social justice,1 yet the Carlyle Group and Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts (KKR), two of the world's leading private equity firms, have
recruited top environmental-advocacy-group staffers to serve as
sustainability managers. 2 Similar hiring has occurred elsewhere in the
private sector, including not only private equity firms, but also
institutional investors and Fortune 500 corporations. Why is this
occurring? What effect is it having on environmental governance?
This symposium examines the role of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in environmental law and policy over the last fifty years
and looks forward to the next fifty years. Our goal in this Article is to
contribute to the forward-looking aspect of the symposium by
demonstrating how private environmental governance will affect a core
concern of environmental-law scholarship over the next fifty years. We
present the results of an empirical study of the movement of employees
from environmental-advocacy groups to corporations, institutional
investors, and private equity firms, and we demonstrate that this new
green revolving door is surprisingly common. We argue that the new
revolving door poses some risks to environmental governance, but it is
an indication of the growing importance of private environmental
governance and a potential driver of additional pro-environmental
activity by the private sector.

1.

See Editorial Bd., Opinion, The Peculiar Debate over Mr. Romney's
Business Record, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/opinions/the-peculiar-debate-over-mr-romneys-business-record/2012/
01/10/gIQATw6MpP story.html [https://perma.cc/X9DU-HTUH]
(discussing Bain Capital).

2.

See infra Part II.
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governance
occurs
when private
Private
environmental
organizations, including corporations, civic and cultural organizations,
religious organizations, colleges and universities, and other nongovermnental organizations (NGOs) perform environmental-protection
functions traditionally assigned to governments, such as reducing
negative externalities, managing common-pool resources, and affecting
the distribution of environmental amenities.3 In the last decade, the
social-science and legal literatures have demonstrated that private
initiatives now play an important governance role in most of the
subject-matter areas addressed by the EPA and other federal
environmental and natural-resource agencies, including climate
mitigation, product- and project-based environmental disclosure, toxics
regulation, and the management of fisheries and forests. 4 Private
governance initiatives also deploy many of the same instruments or
tools as public governance.
The growth of private environmental governance raises a range of
questions about the extent to which private initiatives can perform
environmental-protection functions even in the absence of government
leadership.6 But the emergence of private environental governance
3.

Michael

P.

Vandenbergh,

Private Environmental Governance, 99

CORNELL L. REV. 129, 133 (2013).

4.

Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental
Governance, in DECISION MAKING IN ENVTL. LAW 253 54 (LeRoy C.
Paddock et al. eds., 2016); Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation
as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 139 41 (2019); Jonathan
M. Gilligan, Carrots and Sticks in Private Climate Governance, 6 TEX.
A&M L. REV. 179, 179 80 (2018); Will Martin, Marine Stewardship
Council: A Case Study in Private Environmental Standard-Setting, 44
ENVTL. L.

REP.

NEWS

&

ANALYSIS

10,097, 10,097 (2014)

(fisheries);

Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global Governance
Be Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 347,
347 50 (2007) (forests); Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories:
States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the
Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & SoC'Y 433, 433 34 (2003)
(forests and apparel); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The
Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow
of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44 46 (Walter
Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (international environmental issues);
Zdravka Tzankova, Interactions Between Private and Public Resource
Governance; Key Insights from the Fisheries Case, 6 WM. & MARY
POLY REV. 1 (2014); Zdravka Tzankova, Can Private Governance Boost
Public Policy? Insights from Public-Private Governance Interactions in
the Fisheries and Electricity Sectors, REG. AND GOVERNANCE (2020).
5.

Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private
Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 4 5

(2015).
6.

For an identification of emerging issues of interest to environmental
lawyers, see Michael P. Vandenbergh & Ben Raker, Private Governance
and the New Private Advocacy, 32 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 45, 45 49
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also affects many of the cross-cutting aspects of governance that publiclaw scholars have studied for decades, such as administration
accountability, cost-benefit analysis, equity, and spillover effects. In this
Article, we examine the implicatios of private governance for concerns
about agency capture arising from the revolving door. In the legal and
political-science literatures, the revolving door refers to the movement
of employees between government and corporations.7 Scholars have
examined the mechanisms of this phenomenon and its effects on
industries, agencies, and society, but the revolving-door literature has
assumed that governance means public governance, and thus the focus
has been on the movement of individuals between the corporations and
government.S
Political scientists and legal scholars thus use the term revolving
door to describe the movement of legislators, regulators, and lobbyists
between the private and public sectors.9 The door swings in both
directions as individuals rotate from corporate jobs to government
positions and vice versa. Although some scholars see merit in the
revolving door's ability to foster interconnectedness between the public
and private sectors, 10 many have raised concerns that the revolving door

(2017); Zdravka Tzankova, Public Policy Spillovers from Private Energy
Governance: New Opportunities for the Political Acceleration of
Renewable Energy Transitions, 67 ENERGY RES. & SOC. Sci. (2020).
7.

See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through InstitutionalDesign, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 46 (2010) [hereinafter
Barkow, Insulating Agencies] (discussing the capture risks arising from
the government-private sector revolving door); Rachel E. Barkow,
Explaining and Curbing Capture, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 19 (2013)
[hereinafter Barkow, Curbing Capture]; Wenton Zheng, The Revolving
Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1266 68 (2015) (same); Jeffrey E.
Cohen, The Dynamics of the "Revolving Door" on the FCC, 30 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 689, 689 90 (1986) (same); William T. Gormley, Jr., A Test of
the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 AM. J. POL. ScI. 665, 681
(1979) (concluding that "the appointment of a former employee of a
regulated industry to a regulatory agency does increase the likelihood of
decisions favorable to the regulated industry").

8.

See, e.g., Edna Earle Vass Johnson, Agency "Capture": The "Revolving
Door" Between Regulated Industries and Their Regulating Agencies, 18
U. RICH. L. REV. 95, 95 96 (1983) (assessing capture risks and benefits
and focusing exclusively on government private sector employee
movement); Zheng, supra note 7, at 1266 68 (same); Barkow, Insulating
Agencies, supra note 7, at 46 (same).

9.

See, e.g., Zheng, supra note 7, at 1266. Although the revolving door exists
in many disciplines, the concept is most frequently discussed by political
scientists and legal scholars in connection with agency capture and related
issues. See id. at 1270 72.

10.

David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 507, 511 12 (2013).
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may lead to undue corporate influence over government decisions.11 In
particular, the fear is that the exchange of personnel may undermine
government integrity or lead to regulatory capture. 12 A captured agency
is disproportionately influenced by the entities that it regulates,
creating policies that serve the interests of corporations rather than the
general public. It is difficult to measure whether an agency is captured,
but capture in major regulatory agencies has been a longstanding
concern in the public domain. 13 Environmental agencies may be at a
heightened risk of regulatory capture for several reasons. For instance,
the costs of environmental regulations are high, creating strong
incentives to reduce regulatory mandates. In addition, the complexity
of environmental policy, such as regulations on water pollutants or
greenhouse gases, makes it difficult for the general public to perceive
manipulation within environmental agencies, making them more
14
susceptible to regulatory capture than other agencies.
In Part I, the Article discusses the legal and political-science
literatures on the standard public-governance conception of the
revolving door between the public and private sectors, and it examines

11.

See, e.g., Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1684 87 (1975) (discussing agency capture);
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti- Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
341, 346 (2009) ("The revolving door between staffers and lobbyists, the
lure of powerful contracts, the seductions of a wealthy community, and

other forces all give regular work to what Hamilton called 'the business of
corruption') (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
12.

An agency may be considered captured when a majority of the individuals
creating regulation were formerly employed by the regulated corporate.
See Johnson, supra note 8, at 95.

13.

Barkow, Curbing Capture, supra note 7, at 17; Zheng, supra note 7, at
1267.

14.

See Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1548 49 (1999) (" T] he average citizen knows if he
or she is getting adequate roads or schools and even has a sense of whether
the government regulation of banks seems appropriate. In many
environmental circumstances, however, no comparable basis for judging
the adequacy of outcomes exists."). Research by Joel Mintz has attempted
to assess instances of possible capture within the EPA by evaluating the
Agency's enforcement policies from its creation in 1970 through 2004. Joel
A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured the EPA ?: Appraising Marver
Bernstein's Captive Agency Theory After Fifty Years, 17 FORDHAM
ENVT'L L. REV. 1, 26, 36 (2005) (concluding that the "EPA's enforcement
work has been nearly captured by industry several times and that it was
partially captured on one occasion"); see also Ping Lei et al.,
Determinants and Welfare of the Environmental Regulatory Stringency
Before and After Regulatory Capture, 166 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 107,
110, 113 (2017); PHILIP MATTERA, USDA INC.: How AGRIBUSINESS HAS
HIJACKED REGULATORY POLICY AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRICULTURE 32 (2004).
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the federal statutory and regulatory responses. Part II then introduces
the concept of the new revolving door between environmental-advocacy
groups, on the one hand, and corporations, institutional investment
firms, and private equity firms on the other. It then presents the results
of the first empirical study of the new revolving door. We found that,
of the entities we studied, roughly 6% of large companies, 15% of large
institutional investment firms, and 29% of large private equity firms
had at least one environmental manager who worked in the past at an
environmental-advocacy group. Although far more research remains to
be done, the results demonstrate that the new revolving door has
emerged in the environmental field, producing different implications for
governance than the standard revolving door. Although the new
revolving door is not without risk, we argue that it may turn the central
concern about the revolving door on its head: The movement of
environmental advocates into private-sector management positions may
play the role of greening the private sector and accelerating the
development of private environmental initiatives.
The Article concludes by noting that, although the empirical case
for the new revolving door relies only on our limited data on recent
employment in several sectors, our results set the stage for more
comprehensive empirical studies. In addition, the existence of the new
revolving door suggests that other common features of the publicgovernance regime may need to be re-examined in light of the
emergence of private environmental governance. We focus on the new
revolving door involving environmental-advocacy groups and the
private sector a new green revolving door but we suggest that the
new revolving door also may be emerging in labor, health and safety,
fair trade, food safety, and other regulatory areas. I"
I.

THE TRADITIONAL REVOLVING DOOR

The concept of the revolving door has been a hardy perennial in
the legal and political-science literatures for decades. Not surprisingly,
given the central role played by government in environmental
protection, labor, health and safety, and other areas, the focus of the
revolving-door literature has been on the movement between
government and the private sector. Scholars have identified positive
and negative effects from the revolving door, but, on balance, the
literature has focused more on the negative effects that could arise from
government being co-opted by the private sector. The congressional
response to such concerns reflects this perspective, and legislation
adopted since World War II includes a range of provisions that restrict
the most troubling revolving-door activity. Part II.A discusses the
15.

See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE

AGE OF INDUSTRIAL FOOD 129 30 (2013) (discussing the use of private
certification agencies in the kosher food industry).
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revolving-door literature, and Part JJ.B examines the statutory
restrictions on the revolving-door-related activities of current and
former government officials.
A.

Revolving-Door Literature

Research on the revolving door has examined the topic both broadly
as it relates to human behavior and narrowly, working from an
assumption that employees are rational actors seeking to maximize
utility in the form of future employment. Although the revolving door
literature has identified a number of benefits that may arise from the
revolving door, the research has identified more risks than benefits. We
begin with a brief review of the benefits identified ii the literature and
then turn to the risks.
1.

Benefits

Theoretical and empirical studies have identified several benefits to
public governance that may arise from the revolving door, including
increased expertise, addition of outside-expert perspectives, and the
growth of human capital.16 On the expertise issue, scholars have noted
that government agencies require substantial expertise on complex
issues. As a result, the revolving door can be beneficial if private sector
employees bring their knowledge about the operations of regulated
entities to government agencies. 17 On the issue of adding outside-expert
perspectives, Sheila Jasanoff has observed that, to function effectively
in evaluating the work of a regulatory agency, one needs skills that are
best (or only) acquired through previous engagement with the agency;
so individual experts engaging with regulatory agencies can be essential
to producing qualified external evaluators of an agency's work. 8 This
engagement could include working with the agency from the outside or
employment in the agency. To the extent the revolving door facilitates
an agency's ability to identify and work with outside evaluators on
complex issues, the revolving door may thus enhance the decision16.

For an overview of the literature, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
Revolving Elites: The Unexplored Risk of Capturing the SEC, 107 GEO.
L.J. 845, 853 59 (2019) (discussing agency revolving-door concerns);
Joshua McCrain, Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of
CongressionalStaff Connections, 80 J. POL. 1369, 1369, 1380 82 (2018)
(discussing legislative revolving-door concerns).

17.

Zaring, supra note 10, at 511 12.

18.

SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH
POLICYMAKERS 95 (1994) ("From

BRANCH:

SCIENCE

ADVISERS
As
...
the best

[the] EPA's point of view

scientific advisers are clearly those with the deepest understanding of
regulatory science .... Such familiarity can rarely be acquired except

through long and close association with the agency, a state that would be
almost impossible to achieve under a policy of frequent rotations.");
Harvey Brooks, The Resolution of Technically Intensive Public Policy
Disputes, 9 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 39, 41 (1984).
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making of the agency's managers. Jasanoff has also argued that experts
may not only bring subject-matter expertise to government (when they
move into government positions from the private sector), but they also
may bring strong political or normative views. 1" Although this creates
a risk that the experts may pursue corporate rather than public
interests, Jasanoff argues that adding some private-sector perspectives
to an agency's decision-making process may enable the agency to
20
produce more effective regulations.
A third potential benefit of the revolving door may arise from the
growth of human capital. In this context, human capital refers to the
skills and connections that an individual may accrue while working for
the government. 21 Although government employees typically earn lower
salaries than those working in the private sector, the human-capital
hypothesis suggests that the potential for learning key skills and making
important connections is considered valuable compensation. 22 The
hypothesis applies to two types of individuals: less-qualified employees
who are just beginning their careers and highly-qualified employees with
years of experience. 23 Less-experienced employees have an opportunity
to develop corporate-specific human capital by working diligently and
abiding by the rules. When a government employee is seeking to
transition to the private sector, human capital becomes an important
part of the applicant's qualifications. Similarly, an individual in the
public sector who has already accrued substantial skills and connections
may be motivated to adhere to the rules and take aggressive
enforcement actions to demonstrate their competence to future
employers. 24 In this view, human capital ii the form of valuable skills
or a positive reputation incentivizes honest, hard work in the public
sector. Scholars who focus on human capital have also suggested that

19.

JASANOFF, supra note 18, at 230 31, 234.

20.

Id.

21.

See Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for
Agency Collusion, 26 RAND J. ECON. 378, 379 (1995). The humancapital hypothesis may be particularly important in complex areas such
as environmental law and policy. See e.g., Esty, supra note 14, at 1548.
Of course, this discussion assumes that the current level of enforcement is
suboptimal and that more stringent enforcement is desirable. See
ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 83 (1982) (arguing
that "[t]he so-called revolving door ... provides a constant renewal of
talent for both sectors"); Johnson, supra note 8, at 98 99 (noting the
value of training government lawyers who later move into private
practice).

22.

Che, supra note 21, at 393.

23.

Id.

24.

Zheng, supra note 7, at 1268.
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rather than lax, enforcement of
the revolving door promotes stringent,
2
government rules and regulations. o
2.

Risks

The legal and political-science literatures also have identified
several risks arising from the standard revolving door. The first is "rentseeking," or regulatory capture. 26 Government employees may act in
pro-corporate ways to curry favor with potential private-sector
employers. 27 The rent-seeking, or quid pro quo, theory suggests that the
revolving door does not make federal officials more diligent policymakers or more stringent enforcers as suggested by the human-capital
hypothesis but instead creates an environment where regulators and
lawmakers are incentivized to act with more lenience. 28 An explicit or
implicit quid pro quo relationship thus may exist where preferential
treatment towards a private firm is exchanged for future employment.
A commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for
example, may attempt to ease a regulation's enforcement against a
certain private firm to curry favor with that company. 29 As a result, the
firm may be inclined to repay the favor with a job offer. The rentseeking hypothesis aligns with the fundamentals of capture theory,
suggesting that the revolving door compromises the integrity of
government officials and has adverse effects on agencies' effectiveness.
Researchers who assume that government employees are seeking to
maximize a narrow notion of utility often ground their concerns in
public-choice theory.30 Much of the research has focused on two
revolving-door models: entrance and exit.31 The entrance model refers
to those who work at a private company or lobbying group prior to
working for the government. As the model suggests, those who have
25.

See supra note 21.

26.

Stephen J. Choi et al., Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Gender Gap
for Securities and Exchange Commission Attorneys, 62 J.L. & ECON.
427, 431 (2019); see also MICHAEL SMALLBERG, PROJECT ON GOV'T
OVERSIGHT,
DANGEROUS
LIAISONS:
REVOLVING
DOOR AT SEC
CREATES RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 3 (2013).

27.

See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 862 63; Ed deHaan et al., The
Revolving Door and the SEC's Enforcement Outcomes: Initial Evidence
from Civil Litigation, 60 J. ACCT. & ECON. 65, 91 92 (2015); Michael A.
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1353 (2013) (noting the incentive for government
employees to develop "friendly relationships" while in government to
facilitate later private-sector employment).

28.

See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 862 63.

29.

See deHaan et al., supra note 27, at 66.

30.

See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 847.

31.

See Cohen, supra note 7, at 690; Ernesto Dal B6, Regulatory Capture: A
Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 203, 204 (2006).
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experience in the private sector are more likely to make decisions that
support corporations than those who do not have prior private-sector
experience. In many cases, these entrance-model hidividuals may be
ingrained with perspectives that are biased toward the private sector.
For example, an SEC commissioner who was previously employed in
the finance sector may vote to enforce programs that support that
sector's growth.3 2 The exit model of the revolving door describes
hidividuals who work ii the public sector before taking a position at a
private firm. As with the entrance model, hidividuals who follow the
exit model may make decisions while ii government based on
prospective job opportunities ii the private sector.
Both forms of the revolving door, entrance and exit, have become
common ii the federal legislative and executive branches. In a study of
the revolving door among staff at the SEC, James Cox and Randall
Thomas note that the risks of pro-corporate bias arising from the
traditional revolving door among lower-level SEC employees may
be limited by the fact that many of the SEC's decisions are made
with hiput from groups of employees and are subject to many layers
of oversight.33 They conclude that a greater risk arises at the
director level where those constraints are less influential. 4 These
results are consistent with the results of studies that examine
potential revolving-door-based bias among commissioners at the
SEC and Federal Communications Commission.o
In addition to affecthig the regulatory decision-making of agency
managers, the revolving door also may undermine public confidence ii
government generally.36 Zahra Meghiani and Jennifer Kuzma have
focused on the importance of expertise and have observed that "[t]he
existence of the revolving door could adversely impact the public's
confidence in new technological products, review protocols, regulatory

32.

See Cohen, supra note 7, at 690; deHaan et al., supra note 27, at 66.

33.

See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 899.

34.

Id.

35.

See deHaan et al., supra note 27, at 91 92 (SEC); Gormley, supra note 7,
at 681 (FCC).

36.

See Zahra Meghani & Jennifer Kuzma, The "Revolving Door" Between
Regulatory

Agencies

and

Industry:

A

Problem

That

Requires

Reconceptualizing Objectivity, 24 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 575, 581

(2011); see also JASANOFF, supra note 18, at 95, 247 (noting that an
excessive reliance upon the same group of experts revolving in and out of
regulatory agencies, such as the EPA, can compromise those agencies'
independence and that, when this leads to a disproportionate voice for
experts from the corporate sector, it "lead[s] to skepticism about the
scientific claims certified by an [agency's] advisory committee.").
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decisions about them, and the government in general."37 They also
conclude that "[t]he revolving door phenomenon virtually guarantees
industry a seat at the policy-making table even though other
stakeholders have 11o assurance that their concerns will be addressed by
governent regulatory bodies."38
Unconscious bias is also a concern. Sheila Jasanoff and Harvey
Brooks have noted that the revolving door can transfer normative and
political views from the private sector to governent and influence
governent decision-making.39 They emphasize that people are not fully
rational in making judgments about factual issues, and that scientific
judgment can be swayed by normative and political views. Therefore,
people who move from corporate to regulatory roles may unconsciously
allow their sympathy toward corporations to influence their judgments,
even if they intend to act faithfully ii their regulatory capacity.40 In
addition, as Brooks has noted:
The more an issue is in the public eye, the more expert judgments
are likely to be influenced unconsciously by pre-existing policy
preferences or by supposedly unrelated factors such as media
presentations, the opinions of colleagues or friends, or even the
4n
emotional overtones of certain words used in the debate.

37.

Meghani & Kuzma, supra note 36, at 576. David Luban has described the
insights gained from the revolving door "as a kind of 'insider trading' in
the world of power, rather than finance," and has argued that it "exhibits
a disquieting agnosticism about the common good." David Luban, The

Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717,
728 (1988).
38.

Meghani & Kuzma, supra note 36, at 577.

39.

JASANOFF, supra note 18, at 69 71, 79 83, 234 41; Brooks, supra note 18,
at 39 40; Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, Probability Assessment

and Decision Analysis of Alternative Nuclear Fuel Cycles, in NATIONAL
ENERGY ISSUES: How Do WE DECIDE? 241, 264 (Robert G. Sachs, ed.

1980).
40.

JASANOFF, supra note 18, at 69 71, 79 83, 234 41; Brooks, supra note 18,

at 48 ("Energy experts, for example, tend to focus on energy production
or on energy end use technical efficiency, with little consideration for
environmental impacts or organizational and distributional effects.
Experts on air pollution tend to ignore what effect air cleanup efforts
might have on the pollution of other media, or at least to regard it as
outside their purview. Experts on industrial policy see environmental,

health, and safety regulations exclusively in terms of their retarding effects
on economic growth; public health experts view industrial activities in
terms of their potential impacts on public health, treating overall
economic effects of emissions or ambient standards as outside their
purview. Such fragmentation of expertise may also contribute to the
current emphasis on single-issue politics.").
41.

Brooks, supra note 18, at 40.
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The revolving door also may induce government employees to
hicrease the complexity of regulations to create demand for their
expertise.42 Unlike the human-capital and rent-seeking theories, which
both assume that government officials act in response to the needs of
the private sector, the market-expansion theory assumes that
individuals working in the public sector do not take corporate needs as
a given. Instead, under this theory, government officials are incentivized
to create regulatory systems that expand the private sector's need for
their services, thus increasing demand for their labor once they stop
working for the government. 43 This can manifest itself in different ways,
depending on the government agency. For example, in a rule-makiig
setting, government officials may advocate for the implementation of
complex rules that require technical expertise to understand. Similarly,
government officials in enforcement roles may support harsh penalties
for failing to abide by enforcement policies to create demand in
44
prospective employers for employees with enforcement expertise.
Overall, although the literature identifies a number of potential
benefits from the traditional revolving door, the bulk of the literature
suggests that the revolving door may induce government officials to act
in ways that serve the private sector at the expense of the public
interest. Not surprisingly, given the range of theories about the
incentives created by the revolving door, a great deal of uncertainty
exists in the empirical literature about the impact of the revolving door.
A number of empirical studies have identified pro-private-sector bias
arising from the revolving door, but the effects are difficult to tease out,
and, as the Cox and Thomas study suggests, the effects may depend on
4
the context in which employee decision-making occurs.
B.

Regulatory Response

Despite the ambiguity in the signal from empirical studies, concerns
about agency capture and other adverse effects on government decisionmaking have led to both legislative and regulatory efforts to restrict the
revolving door. Congress has enacted several major statutes to address
the adverse effects of the revolving door by promoting transparency,
eliminating acts of reciprocity, and including other measures designed
to maintain the hitegrity of government agencies. 46 The first major
42.

See, e.g., Zheng, supra note 7, at 1269.

43.

Id.; Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 856 58.

44.

Zheng, supra note 7, at 1281.

45.

See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 899.

46.

For an overview of post-Watergate legislation, see Johnson, supra note 8;
Rafael Gely & Asghar Zardkoohi, Measuring the Effects of PostGovernment-Employment Restrictions,3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 288, 290
92 (2001) (describing attempts to limit the revolving-door problem). For
a discussion regarding revolving-door restrictions applicable to lawyers,
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federal legislation on lobbying, the Federal Regulation Lobbying Act
(FRLA) of 1946, 47 established a general set of rules for lobbyists. The
FRLA required lobbyists to disclose their personal expenditures and
prohibited them from giving gifts to legislators. In the face of a First
Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court upheld the FRLA, stating
that, without the Act, "the voice of the people may all too easily be
drowned out by the voice of special interest groups. 4 Although the
FRLA did not directly address the revolving door, it sought to promote
an ethical relationship between lobbyists and government officials, and
it served as a precursor to later legislation. The Federal Regulation
Lobbying Act was repealed in 1995 when it was replaced by the
Lobbying Disclosure Act, which included similar provisions but created
a more comprehensive registration process for lobbyists and required
49
the disclosure of more specific information.
In 1962, Congress added two specific statutory provisions, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 207 and 208, that serve as the foundation for modern revolving-door
laws.O Section 207 sets forth strict regulations for government
employees to follow once their government employment has
terminated. 1 Under this provision, members of the executive branch
are permanently banned from "switching sides" on any matter that they
"personally and substantially" participated in while working for the
government. 2 This bars former government employees from
representing in court a private employer or lobbying group when the
case involves an issue that they dealt with while in office. When the
relevant matter is more broadly related to the individual's previous
government work, the statute only prohibits them from switching sides
for two years. Additionally, former members of the executive branch
are prohibited for one year following their service from facilitating trade
or treaty negotiations. Depending on the seniority of the position they
once held, former officials of both the legislative and executive branches
see Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 689 90
(1989). For an early focus on legislative lobbying, see Joseph I. Hochman,
Comment, Post-Employment Lobbying Restrictions on the Legislative
Branch of Government: A Minimalist Approach to Regulating Ethics in
Government, 65 WASH. L. REV. 883 (1990).
47.

Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 839 (repealed 1995).

48.

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).

49.

2 U.S.C. §§ 1601 12 (Supp. 1 1995); see also Rebecca L. Anderson, The
Rules in the Owners' Box: Lobbying Regulations in State Legislatures, 40
URB. LAW. 375, 382 (2008).

50.

18 U.S.C. §§ 207 08 (Supp. 1 1962).

51.

Id. § 207 (Supp. 1 1962).

52.

See id. § 207(a); JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42728,
POST- EMPLOYMENT,

"REVOLVING

PERSONNEL 3 (2014).
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are also subject to either one- or two-year "cooling-off" periods during
which they may not make representational communications with other
members of their respective branches. Finally, individuals who held
certain high-level executive or legislative positions are prohibited from
aiding foreign governments or political parties." Collectively, the
provisions of § 207 established the modern foundation for postgovernment service restrictions.
Section 208 sets forth regulations that government employees must
abide by while still employed by the government.o4 Members of the
executive branch cannot "personally and substantially" take part in any
activity that will impact their financial interests, including any
negotiations or arrangements regarding future private employment
opportunities.o Once a federal employee engages in negotiations for
employment, the employee must remove themselves from any
governmental responsibilities that have a direct effect on the financial
hiterests of the involved private companies. 6 in addition to their own
personal financial interests, federal employees are prohibited from
participathig in activities that may affect the hiterests of their spouses,
partners, or children.
The next major piece of legislation, the Ethics in Government Act
(EGA), was passed in 1978 and substantially expanded the existing
requirements.5 7 The EGA was enacted in the years following the Nixon
Watergate scandal, a time when mistrust of the government was high.
Congress passed the EGA in an effort to bolster incentives for ethical
practices among lobbyists and government employees and to restore the
public's faith in government.S Building on the FRLA's requirement
that lobbyists disclose their contributions, the EGA required senior
federal executives to publicly disclose their personal financial interests. 9
The requirement was designed to enhance transparency and reduce
conflicts of interest between lobbyists and federal employees. Further,
the EGA established several structural improvements in an effort to
ensure greater compliance with existing ethics laws. For instance, the
EGA mandated the creation of the Office of Government Ethics and
the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, and it authorized the Attorney

53.

MASKELL, supra note 52, at 3 6.

54.

18 U.S.C. § 208 (Supp. 1 1962).

55.

Id.

56.

See MASKELL, supra note 53, at 8.

57.

28 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. IV 1976).

58.

Cody D. Earl, Comment, Behind the Times: A Comparative Argument
that the State of Idaho Should Combat the Revolving Door Effect with
Waiting Period Legislation, 52 IDAHo L. REV. 639, 648 (2016).

59.

See J. Jackson Walter, The Ethics in Government Act, Conflict of Interest
Laws and PresidentialRecruiting, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 659, 659 (1981).
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General to appoint a special counsel to investigate any member of the
executive branch, including the President. 0
In response to the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal, in 2006
Congress adopted the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act
(HLOGA). The Act provided more stringent regulations for lobbyists
and federal employees, and it extended the "cooling-off" periods
established in 18 U.S.C. § 207, mandating two years of cooling off for
members of the legislative and executive branches before they can
participate in lobbying activities. 1 The Act also established criminal
penalties for unethical private-employment negotiations and required
the public disclosure of such violations. The HLOGA also banned
lobbyists from offering gifts to federal employees in the form of paid
trips, which formerly had been considered a loophole inthe law. Filally,
the Act hicluded significant improvements to the oversight of lobbyists'
contributions to legislation.62 These improvements included more
frequent disclosure reports, the creation of a public online database for
these reports, and more accurate accounts of lobbyists' personal and
bundled contributions.63
Although the efficacy of these provisions is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is clear that concerns about the adverse effects of the
revolving door between government and the private sector have driven
much of the government-reform legislation of the last several decades.
Little or no legislation or regulatory activity appears to promote the
revolving door. Instead, the underlying concern appears to be derived
from some form of the capture hypothesis: that movement between the
private sector and government will induce government employees to
serve private-sector interests, not the public interest, however defined.
In Part III, we present the results of an empirical study that
demonstrate a surprising amount of movement between environmentaladvocacy groups and the private sector, and we examine whether, just
as the concerns about private sector-to-government movement may
affect the government's decision-making,
the movement
of
environmental interests and values to corporations, institutional
investment firms, and private equity firms may affect the decisionmaking of these private sector organizations.
II.

THE NEW REVOLVING DOOR

The revolving-door literature has focused on the benefits and risks
of employee movement between government and corporations. The
60.

See Anderson, supra note 49, at 380.

61.

2 U.S.C. §§ 1601 14 (Supp. II 2007); Anderson, supra note 49, at 383;
MASKELL, supra note 53, at 1.

62.

Anderson, supra note 49, at 383 84.

63.

Id. at 384.
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literature has emphasized the risks to the effectiveness and integrity of
public governance, and the legislative and regulatory responses have
reflected those concerns. In the last few decades, however, the federallegislative conveyor belt for major pollution-control statutes has ground
to a halt, and the private sector has begun to play a greater role in
performing traditionally governmental environmental-protection
functions on issues ranging from climate change to toxics. 6 4 If private
environmental governance is playing a greater role ii environmental
protection, and if for-profit firms are motivated to respond to
environmental problems by more than simply influencing government
action, then we might expect to see greater demand by for-profit firms
for environmental managers with environmental advocacy-group
experience and perspectives, and greater movement between
environmental-advocacy groups and those firms.
Anecdotal media accounts have provided examples of individuals
moving from environmental-advocacy groups to positions managing the
sustainability efforts for companies or investment firms.6" For instance,
Jackie Roberts moved from the Environmental Defense Fund to become
the Chief Sustainability Officer for the Carlyle Group, where she
manages the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) efforts of
the firm. 66 She spent seventeen years at the Environmental Defense
fund before taking this position at Carlyle, having served as the
Director of Sustainable Technologies and Senior Director of the
Climate and Energy Idea Bank.67 Similarly, Elizabeth Seeger, the
director of Sustainable Investing at KKR, followed a similar career
trajectory. Seeger started her career at the Environmental Law
Institute, a non-profit that conducts research on environmental law
and policy. She then spent two years in the private sector, working

64.

See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond
Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J. ENVIL. L. 217 (2015) (climate change); Michael
P. Vandenbergh et al., Lamarck Revisited: The Implications of
Epigenetics for Environmental Law, 7 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1,
25 43 (2017) (toxics); Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as
Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019) (other topics).

65.

Although the new revolving door we discuss in the Article addresses
movement between environmental advocacy groups and firms, there is
some evidence of a related phenomenon involving conservative think
tanks,
tort-reform
organizations,
and
the Reagan
and
Bush
administrations. See W. John Moore, Keeping the Faith, 23 NAW'L J. 734,
735 36 (1991).

66.

The Carlyle Group Names Jackie Roberts Chief Sustainability Officer,
CARLYLE GROUP (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.carlyle.com/media-room/
news-release-archive/carlyle-group-names-jackie-roberts-chief-sustainabilityofficer [https://perma.cc/5ANZ-LPD7].

67.

Operating Executives 6 Advisors: Jackie Roberts, CARLYLE GROUP,
https://www.carlyle.com/corporate-overview/operating-executives-advisors/
jackie-roberts [https://perma.cc/QT5D-TW94] (last visited June 10, 2020).
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at an information-technology consulting firm before taking a
position at the Environmental Defense Fund.6 8 Following her
tenure there, Seeger joined KRR.
Given the growth of private environmental governance, it is
plausible that these are not just outliers but examples of a more
widespread phenomenon. To test this hypothesis, we conducted the
first empirical study of the new revolving door between environmentaladvocacy groups and large corporations, institutional investment firms,
and private equity firms. Below, we discuss the methodology, results,
and implications of our study.
A.

Methodology

Our study examined evidence of the movement of individuals who
held management positions at environmental-advocacy groups and then
transitioned to environmental-management
positions in large
corporations, institutional investment firms, and private equity firms.
To begin, we defined environmental-advocacy group to mean a nongovernmental organization that is principally or substantially dedicated
to environmental protection or sustainability advocacy (e.g., the
Environmental Defense Fund, Sierra Club, and Natural Resources
Defense Council). We defined corporate employment to mean corporate,
institutional investment firm, or private equity firm employment in a
position that is principally or substantially dedicated to managing
environmental protection or sustainability issues. For environmental
managers in firms, we searched websites to identify employees who held
environmental-management
positions based on the types of
environmental employees who were publicly disclosed as playing some
type of environmental management role by the firm. Within financial
institutions, the individuals that fall into this category are often tasked
with participating in the management of sustainable or responsible
investing or investor relations. Within firms, these individuals may have
broader tasks, such as compliance and reporting, and broader titles,
such as chief sustainability officer or director of corporate social
responsibility.
We reviewed the publicly available data regarding environmental
managers at the three types of firms in the United States discussed
above: large corporations, large institutional investment firms, and
large private equity firms.69 To perform this analysis, we selected the

68.

Team: Elizabeth Seeger, KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS, https://www.kkr
.com/our-firrm/leadership/elizabeth-seeger [https://perma.cc/3657-PSXN]
(last visited June 10, 2020).

69.

Although we examined these three categories, some firms fit into multiple
categories. For example, Blackstone handles both private equity and
institutional investing and its Chief Sustainability Officer handles all
portfolios. See BLACKSTONE, https://blackstone.com/the-firrm/overview
[https://perma.cc/23W2-P7K4] (last visited June 10, 2020).
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100 largest firms on the Fortune 500 list of companies, the twenty-five
largest firms on the Investment Pensions Europe (IPE) Top 400 list of
asset managers, and the twenty-five largest firms on the Private Equity
International (PEI) 300 list of private equity finms. 7° Each of these
publicly available sources ranked the firms based on revenue.7 1 To focus
our study on the revolving-door phenomenon in the United States, we
excluded firms not headquartered ii the United States.
Information about environmental or sustainability managers was
not available for all of the firms on these three lists. Of the Fortune 100
corporations, we were only able to locate information about the
72
environmental or sustainability managers for eighty-one corporations.
Of the twenty-five largest institutional investment firms, we were able
to locate information about environmental or sustainability managers
for twenty firms. Of the twenty-five largest private equity firms, we
were able to locate information about these managers for fourteen
73

firms.

70.

We reviewed the top-100 Fortune companies. In both the PEI and IPE
lists, we reviewed the top twenty-five companies with headquarters
located in the United States; we removed fiom our list any company
headquartered outside of the United States. See Fortune 500, FORTUNE

MAG., https://fortune.com/fortune5OO/2019/search/

[https://perma.cc/

459U-GRRD] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020); PEI 300, PRIV. EQUITY INT'L,

https://www.privateequityinternational.com/database/#/pei-300

[https://

perma.cc/MG9H-KFBZ] (last visited Jan 20, 2020); INV. & PENSIONS
EUR., THE Top 400 ASSET MANAGERS 2019, at 1 (2019), https://www

.ipe.com/Uploads/j/e/b/Top-400-Ranking-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5BTC-2GXJ].
71.

The Fortune 500 rankings are based on a company's total revenue for the
respective fiscal years. Methodology for Fortune 500, FORTUNE MAG.,
https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/methodology [https://perma.cc/
EFM7-N5MQ] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). The IPE 400 calculates the
value of each manager's global assets. INV. & PENSIONS EUR., supra note
70, at 1. The PEI 300 uses how much capital each company raised over
the last five years. The World's Largest Private Equity Firms, PRIV.
EQUITY INT'L, https://www.privateequityinternational.com/pei-300/
[https://perma.cc/AYF3-TBKV] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). We started
with the Fortune 500 companies but examined only the 100 largest of
those firms, or the Fortune 100. A brief examination of the bottom 400
firms identified fewer firms that provide public information on their
environmental or sustainability managers. This may suggest that smaller
firms simply have less of a presence online or that the new revolving door
is a large-firm phenomenon. More research is needed to assess this issue.

72.

The lack of a website regarding sustainability or environmental initiatives
may make it more likely that these firms do not have an environmental
or sustainability staff, but we excluded them from our analysis and did
not draw inferences from the lack of information.

73.

In the case of institutional investors, we found information about the
sustainable-investing staff of twenty out of the twenty-five companies.
The list of the top twenty-five large, institutional investors included two
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For each firm for which we were able to locate information about
environmental managers, we reviewed the previous work experience of
the managers ii charge of environmental matters. The firms differed ii
the location of information about the managers, the mianagers' titles,
and the assignment of environmental responsibilities.7 4 We followed a
set of uniform searching procedures to evaluate each firm. Across all
three types of firms, we began by searching the corporate leadership
page on the firm website for any managers ii charge of environmental
policy. The positions we looked for included chief sustainability officer,
chief operating officer, or any vice president with relevant
environmental or sustainable responsibilities. If the company's website
included biographies, we used the biographies to identify whether the
manager had previously worked for an environmental- advocacy
organization. If biographies were not available, we used Linkedln or
Bloomberg to ascertain the person's employment history. After
examining the firm's corporate leadership page, we evaluated the
environmental information available on the firm's website. We
examined the firm's corporate responsibility webpage, or, if available,
the firm's page on environmental sustainability, for further information
about the management of their sustainable policies. 7 We then used
Linkedln to search for any additional environmental executives who
were not listed on the corporate webpage. The search included the full
company name and the following keywords: "chief sustainability
officer,"
Tenvironment,"
sustainability,"
and
"corporate
responsibility. "76
We evaluated the data using two approaches. First, we used a broad
definition, treating as a "revolver" any firm employee who held a
position at some point in the past with an environmental-advocacy
organization. We also examined the data using a narrow definition,
treating as a revolver only those firm employees whose prior
employment occurred with an environmental advocacy organization
within the last eighteen months. We refer to this eighteen month period
branches of Prudential Financial: PGIM and PGIM Fixed Income. INV.
& PENSIONS EUR., supra note 70, at 1. We treated these two branches as
one unit because the impact-management team at Prudential oversees all
of the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) efforts at Prudential.
See Investing Sustainably, PRUDENTIAL, https://www.prudential.com/
links/about/gTeen-investments [https://perma.cc/SQ43-ZUX2] (last visited
Jan. 25, 2020).
74.

The companies on the list range in their services, functions, products, and
environmental concerns. See Fortune 500, supra note 70. For example, a
company such as Exxon Mobil, an oil and gas corporation, has different
environmental responsibilities than JP Morgan Chase, a bank.

75.

For the private equity firms and asset managers, we searched for the
company page on ESG investing.

76.

Again, for private equity firms and asset managers, we included the term
"ESG investing."

1139

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW - VOLUME 70 - ISSUE

4 -2020

The New Revolving Door
as a "cooling-off period."77 In other words, we examined the data with
11o time limit, including as a revolver any firm employee who had
worked at any poiut in the past for an environmental-advocacy
organization (in a full-time, non-internship position), and we examined
the data with an eighteen month time limit, excluding any employee
whose employment as an environmental-advocacy-group manager
concluded more than eighteen months before the employee moved to a
firm.
B.

Results

This study identified a substantial number of firms with employees
who rotated through the new revolving door, moving from
environment al-advocacy
groups into positions managing the
environmental policies of large companies, institutional investment
firms, and private equity firms. Using the broad definition of revolver,
of the firms for which information was available on the employment
history of environmental managers, we found that roughly 6% of the
large companies we studied, 15% of large institutional investment firms,
and 29% of large private equity firms had at least one environmental
manager who worked at some period inthe past at an environmentaladvocacy group. Using the narrow definition of revolver, we found that
roughly 4% of the large companies we studied, 5% of large institutional
investment firms, and 29% of large private equity firms had at least one
environmental manager who worked at an environmental advocacy
group within the last eighteen months. The results for each type of firm
are as follows:
Corporations. Of the eighty-one large corporations for which we
were able to locate information about environmental managers, we
identified five firms with individuals who had rotated from an
environmental advocacy group to the private sector. In other words,
6% of the eighty-one corporations in our study employed an
environmental manager who had previously worked at an
environmental-advocacy group. 7 We also examined the data usiug the
77.

Empirical studies of the revolving door have often used a "cooling-off"
period in their research. See, e.g., Jacob R. Straus, Cong. Research Serv.,
R45946, Executive Branch Service and the "Revolving Door" in Cabinet
Departments: Background and Issues for Congress (2019). A cooling-off
period is an amount of time between an individual's employment in the
public and private sectors. Revolving Door Prohibitions, NAT'L CONF.
ST. LEGIS. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50state-table-revolving-door-prohibitions.aspx
[https://perma.cc./M9HR2AB]. In some studies, if an individual surpasses the cooling-off period
before moving through the revolving door, they are not considered to be
a revolver.

78.

We identified six individuals out of eighty-one firms who had worked for
an environmental advocacy group at some point. One company,
Citigroup, had two of these revolvers, so the total of firms with a revolver
was five.
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more narrow definition of revolver, which excludes employees who
moved from an environmental advocacy group to a firm more than
eighteen-months after they worked for the advocacy group (the
"cooling-off period"). We found that three firms or 4% had employees
who met this narrow definition of revolver.
Institutional Investment Firms. Of the twenty large institutional
investment firms for which we were able to locate information about
environmental managers, we found three firms with environmental
managers who had worked for an environmental-advocacy group at
some point in the past. Thus the results indicate that 15% of the large
institutional investment firms for which we were able to locate
information about environmental managers have an employee who
worked at an environmental-advocacy group. 79 Two of these employees
moved to the institutional investment firms more than eighteen months
after their employment with an environmental advocacy organization,
so the application of the cooling off period reduces the total number of
revolvers to one (or 5% of the twenty firms).
Private Equity Firms. Of the fourteen large private equity firms for
which we were able to locate information about environmental
managers, we identified four individuals who had worked at an
environmental-advocacy group at some point before moving into an
environmental-management position at a private equity firm. 0 As a
result, 29% of the private equity firms in our study have an
environmental manager who worked at an environmental-advocacy
group. All of these employees moved to private equity firms within
eighteen months of their employment with an environmental advocacy
organization, so the application of the cooling off period has no effect
on the results for the large private equity firms.
Two other related phenomena emerged from the data. The first is
that several individuals have moved from management positions in
presidential administrations that are widely regarded as being proenvironment to environmental management positions at private
companies. 1 This is a form of the traditional revolving door, but it
raises an interesting new possibility: individuals who bring 'green"
values to companies from pro-environment administrations may be as
likely to "green" firms when they move to the private sector as to

79.

In addition, one individual had previously worked at a non-environmental
non-profit organization, but we did not include this individual in our total.

80.

Of the four revolvers, two individuals had previously worked at both
environmental-advocacy groups and for the government before taking a
position at a private equity firm.

81.

For an example of an empirical study that does not focus on the new
revolving door specifically but attempts to identify a wide range of
influences on firm behavior and environmental innovation, see Abdelfeteh
Bitat, Environmental Regulation and Eco-innovation: The PorterHypothesis
Refined, 8 EURASIAN Bus. REV. 299 (2018).
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produce pro-business outcomes while in government. An example is Lisa
Jackson, the former EPA Administrator under President Obama. She
has been a vocal advocate for climate mitigation siuce becoming the
Vice President of Environment, Policy and Social Jnitiatives at
Apple.
We collected data from firm website biographies to identify whether
a manager moved from a government environmental manager position
at some point ii the past. We found that among the corporations we
studied twelve managers rotated from presidential administrations, and
one individual worked for both an advocacy organization and an
executive agency before taking a corporate job. 2 We did not pursue
this issue in greater detail, however, since the traditional revolving door
literature already explores movement between government and the
private sector, including administrations often considered to have a a
pro- or anti-environmental perspective.
The second phenomenon is the tendency for environmental or
sustainability managers to have board memberships at environmentaladvocacy organizations. We found that eleven executives who manage
environmental policies for Fortune 100 companies maintain affiliations
with organizations such as land conservancies and solar-power
initiatives. Further, there is a substantial amount of overlap between
board memberships and the revolving door. Of those eleven individuals,
five of them previously held management-level positions with either an
environmental-advocacy group or the executive branch. Similarly,
among the environmental and sustainability executives at institutional
investors, we found eight individuals who have board memberships at
environmental organizations; and among private equity firms, we
identified four executives with similar board memberships. As to both
institutional investors and private equity firms, we also observed
examples of new-revolving-door activity. We did not pursue this issue
in greater detail because there is a high likelihood that private-sectormanager service on environmental-advocacy-group boards is not a new
phenomenon.
C.

Implications

The results discussed above suggest that the new revolving door for
environmental managers is not an isolated phenomenon. Although the
results do not indicate why this movement is occurring, or what effect
it is having on firms, environmental groups, or environmental
governance, the results raise several intriguing possibilities. As for why
this movement is occurring, many large corporations and investment
firms are increasingly motivated to reduce their environmental impacts

82.

We found that four of those individuals rotated from advocacy groups to
the private sector and six of them rotated from presidential
administrations.
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and to improve their environmental reputation. 3 For these firms, hiring
an environmental-advocacy-group manager may provide expertise and
credibility. These employees could provide reputational benefits to
firms that are attempting to market to green retail and corporate
customers and investors and that need to hiteract with green regulators
and legislators. Jasanoff's notion that some skills are best (or only)
developed through previous engagement with a regulatory agency may
also apply to the new revolving door. It may be that previous efforts
by advocacy-group employees to shift private-sector behavior also apply
to the value of movement of advocacy-group employees to corporations
and hivestment firms. These employees may see profitable opportunities
for efficiency or new markets, and they may understand the effects of
the firm and how a firm is perceived in ways that are not apparent to
the firm's employees. They also may serve as hiternal watchdogs over
the corporation's behavior, which could be valuable for firms that rely
heavily on their public reputation.
In addition, the literature on the traditional private public
revolving door provides employee-based reason that the new revolviig
door may be occurrhig. Despite its focus on movement between
government and corporations, the literature sheds some light on the
motivations for, and the implications of, movement from
environmental-advocacy groups to corporations. For histance, the
public-service-motivation
theory (PSM) seeks to explain the
motivations of employees ii ways that may shed light on why some
move from environmental-advocacy groups to private firms. 4 In their
work on PSM, James Perry and Lois Wise identified three disthict
categories of motivations that may hifluence an individual's decision to
work for the government rational, norm-based, and affective.85 Rational
motivations hiclude a sense of self-importance from participathig ii
policy formation, a personal identification with government programs,
and a commitment to a special hiterest. Norm-based motivations
hiclude a sense of duty to serve the public hiterest, feelhigs of loyalty
to the government, and a desire to protect social equity. Affective

83.

See MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN GILLIGAN, BEYOND
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
161 (2017).

84.

See Robert K. Christensen & Bradley E. Wright, The Effects of Public
Service Motivation on Job Choice Decisions: Disentanglingthe Contributions
of Person-OrganizationFit and Person-JobFit, 21 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY 723, 723 (2011) (discussing public-sector employees'
motivations to join public service); James L. Perry & Lois Recascino Wise,
The Motivational Bases of Public Service, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 367, 368

(1990) (same).
85.

Perry & Wise, supra note 84, at 368.
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motivations are a genuine belief in the social importance of a
government program and the "patriotism of benevolence." 6
Perry and Wise's initial findhigs only explained why individuals
may choose to move from the private sector to the public sector. Over
the past thirty years, however, the concept has evolved to explain why
individuals take positions that emphasize public service in any sector
public, private, or non-profit. 7 Researchers have concluded that PSM
is related to a desire to do public service, not necessarily to work in the
public sector. Therefore, PSM teaches that some individuals will work
in any organization that will allow them to fulfill their desire for public
service. If PSM is correct, and if firms are playing a greater role in
environmental governance, we should expect to see employees at
environmental-advocacy groups increasingly viewing private firms as
employers who can provide opportunities for public service regarding
environmental-protection. If the desire to do public service, not to have
a government job, is at the root of some examples of the revolving door,
private firms may appeal to this public-service mindset if they can
persuade advocacy staff that they are committed to increasing their
pro-environmental actions. Thus, PSM may shed light on persons
moving not only between government and the private sector, but also
between advocacy groups and private firms.
As to the effect of the new revolving door on firms, the
environmental managers who have moved to firms from environmentaladvocacy groups may have pro-environment attitudes that induce more
pro-environment behavior from their new employers. In fact, the new
revolving door may turn the central concern about the revolving door
on its head: The movement of environmental advocates into corporate
management positions may play the role of greening the private sector,
inducing for-profit firms to act more in line with the public good. Legal
obligations such as fiduciary duties may pose constraints, but the
business-judgment rule provides a fair amount of decisional space
to allow the new revolvers to pursue pro-environment outcomes in
many situations.88 Hiring an environmental-advocacy-group manager
may enable a firm to ensure that it will hear a diversity of views in an
operating, investing, policymaking or regulatory process. 9 To the
86.

Id. at 369.

87.

See Christensen & Wright, supra note 84, at 724 (noting that recent
research suggests PSM applies to private-sector employees as well as
public-sector employees); Anne Mette Kjeldsen & Christian Botcher
Jacobsen, Public Service Motivation and Employment Sector: Attraction
or Socialization?,23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 899, 900 (2013).

88.

Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80

N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 777 (2004).
89.

See JASANOFF, supra note 18, at 94 95 (noting that the EPA's scientific
advisers have differing views that are unique to their long-term experience
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extent that the ideology of C-suite executives and board members
may be reducing their ability to understand and react to
information about the greening of markets and the opportunities
for corporate efficiency, the presence of these revolvers iside the
tent may enable firms to be more profitable. The presence of the
new revolvers also may make it more difficult for private firms to
violate environmental regulations because there may be a greater
chance that a revolver will speak up before a violation occurs, and
because other employees will perceive there to be a greater risk
that someone inside the firm will speak up or become a
whistleblower.
To the extent that environmental-advocacy group employees have
knowledge, values, and credibility regarding various types of
environmental initiatives, these employees may also be more likely to
participate in private environmental initiatives such those that
advocate for greater disclosure of carbon emissions, setting emissions
goals, adopting environmentally friendly supply-chain-contracting
requirements, and participating ii various collaborative processes. The
new revolving door thus could accelerate development of collaborative
NGO corporate initiatives. Virginia Haufler has argued that there is a
positive role for engagement between NGOs and firms an argument
that may extend to more favorable judgments about environmentaladvocacy-group corporate revolving doors if they lead to greater firm
transparency:
We are still in the early stages of developing "ground rules" for
interaction between the private sector and its critics, however.
But one way to ensure the legitimacy of private sector standard
setting is to make sure the process of developing and

working for the Agency); ROGER A. PIELKE, THE HONEST BROKER:
MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN POLICY AND POLITICS 151 (2007) (arguing

that a decision-maker seeking an "Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives"
should assemble a group of "people with diverse perspectives to provide a
range of options"). Some writers have focused on the importance of
transparency about the NGO process for assuring both public trust and
rigorous evaluation of issues before the NGO. See, e.g., Robert 0.
Keohane & Joseph S. Jr. Nye, Power and Interdependence in the
Information Age, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Sept. Oct. 1998, at 92 ("To be
credible, the information must be produced through a process that is in
accordance with professional norms and characterized by transparency
and procedural fairness."); see also GRAEME AULD, CONSTRUCTING
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE:
THE RISE AND EVOLUTION OF FOREST,
COFFEE, AND FISHERIES CERTIFICATION 39 (2014) (quoting Keohane &

Nye in the context of addressing conflicts of interest between non-profits
and their corporate partners in private-environmental governance).
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implementing standards is a shared endeavor among business,
NGOs, and representative institutions .... 90
The novemneit of einviromneintal mnagers from advocacy organizations
to firns thus has the potential for a positive, "greening" effect on
corporate decisions, although additional empirical work remahis to be
done to test this assertion.
As we noted above, Cox and Thomas suggest that the risks of
pro-corporate bias arishig from the traditional revolving door
among lower-level SEC employees may be limited by the fact that
many SEC decisions are made with hiput from groups of employees
and with many layers of oversight.9 1 They conclude that the
greatest risk of bias arises at the director level where those
constraints are less influential.92 If the same phenomenon occurs
withii corporations, histitutional hivestment firms, and private
equity firms, then we should expect to see some greening influence
arise in firms when advocacy group staff move hito middle and
senior level management positions where they are less constrained
than lower-level employees. The advocacy group-private sector
movement that we have observed has occurred into higher-level
positions such as the chief sustainability officer, so we might expect
to see important greening occur ii these firms, but this is another
area where additional empirical work remahis to be done.
As the discussion above suggests, the new revolvers may
somewhat reduce concerns about agency capture by inducing
bushiesses to take a less adversarial posture toward government ii
lobbying, rule-making proceedhigs, and litigation. In addition, the
new revolving door employees may be a new source of expertise
that poses less risk of capture than movement between goverment
and the private sector. The advocacy group-firm revolvers may be
well-balanced hybrids who possess a form of human capital
knowledge of, and experience with, both advocacy-groups' and

90.

VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 119 (2001). But

Haufler also cautions that such engagement presents new issues:
Private sector standard setting also poses new challenges for
NGOs. To the degree that voluntary initiatives actually raise
standards, the business sector will expect less criticism from these
groups. NGOs will need to publicize good behavior, instead of
concentrating their attention on the bad. But the level of trust
between many NGOs and the business community is quite low.
Some organizations may be willing to engage in dialogue and form
partnerships for specific projects, but they may not be able to
sustain a long-term relationship." Id. at 5.
91.

Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 886.

92.

Id. at 888 89.
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businesses' goals, methods, and iiformation that is difficult to
find elsewhere.
The new revolving door also poses a number of risks. For those who
believe that a firm should pursue profit over other objectives in all
cases, the presence withii the firm of former environmental-advocacygroup managers could threaten the firm's ability to pursue that
mandate. The movement of managers from environmental groups to
private firms also could have a "de-greeiiig" effect on advocacy groups
by draiing away talent. The movement from advocacy groups hito
firms also could subtly alter the motivations of some advocacy-group
employees ."
D.

Limitations

We only examined a subset of the largest U.S. corporations,
histitutional investment firms, and private equity firms In this study.
We also only examined publicly available data about those firms from
their websites and LinkedIn. The large firms excluded from our study
may not hiclude similar movement from environmental-advocacy
groups to firms, and the new green revolving door may not be occurrhig
at smaller firms or at firms outside the United States. 1i addition, our
data only reflect the current status of employees at the firms we studied,
and it is possible that the new revolving door has occurred unobserved
for many years and thus is not a new form of the revolving door. A
longitudinal study would be required to examine this issue.
We examined movement from environmental-advocacy groups to
for-profit firms, but we did not study movement from firms to
environmental-advocacy groups; so another limitation of this research
is that it studied movement in one direction rather than a two-way
revolving door. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that a
substantial amount of movement has occurred from firms to
environmental-advocacy groups. For histance, Jason Clay, who
manages a division of the World Wildlife Fund, has recruited several
former bushiess managers because of their expertise in supply-chaii
management and commodities.9 4 Important tasks for future research
will be to examine movement from firms to advocacy groups and to
explore the implications of that movement.
Finally, we focused on environmental managers, but we did not
evaluate whether the new revolving door is emerghig for other
managers. If the new revolving door is the result of an hicrease in
private governance initiatives, we would expect the new revolving door
93.

See AULD,

supra note 89, at 42 43; BENJAMIN

CASHORE

ET AL.,

GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND
EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY 36 37 (2004).

94.

THE

Jason Clay: Senior Vice President, Markets, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND,
https://www.worldwildlife.org/leaders/jason-clay [https://perrna.cc/L35X46QQ] (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
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to be occurring in other topic areas where private governance is
compethig with or complementing public governance. Examples include
labor regulation, health and safety, fair trade, and food safety.9"
CONCLUSION

The persistent gridlock over federal pollution-control legislation
during the last quarter century has left a gap between the public's
preferences for environmental protection and the actions of the federal
government. This gap has been filled in part by private environmental
governance, and the growth of this form of environmental governance
has generated new hiterest in the motivations of private firms, the
effects of private initiatives on human health and the environment, and
the hiteractions between public and private governance. Research on
these questions will be important for understanding not only the role of
the private sector but also the future of federal environmental
regulation and the EPA. In this Article, we explored a fascinating new
development that signals the growing importance of private sector
responses to environmental problems: the emergence of a new revolving
door. Since the birth of the modern environmental statutory framework
in the 1970s, environmental law scholars have focused on the role of
public governance and have raised concerns that the revolving door
between corporations and government agencies could induce
government officials to pursue corporate interests at the expense of
environmental protection. In addition, the broader legal and politicalscience literatures have identified benefits that may arise from the
revolving door, but the thrust of the scholarship to date has emphasized
the potential harms.
In this Article, we demonstrated that a new revolving door has
emerged alongside the private sector's increased role in environmental
governance. Rather than employees moving between government and
corporations, this new revolving door involves employees moving
between environmental-advocacy groups and large corporations,
institutional investment firms, and private equity firms. Usiug several
data sources, we demonstrated that this new revolving door is
surprisingly common, and we examined the implications for the future
of public and private environmental governance. Although this new
revolving door is not without risk, we argue that it may turn the central
concern about the revolving door on its head: The movement of
environmental advocates into firm management positions may green
the private sector and accelerate the development of private
environmental initiatives. We focused on the movement of
environmental or sustainability managers between advocacy groups and
corporations, but we suggest that the new revolving door also may be
95.

See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4 (identifying examples of private
governance in these areas on a global level).
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emerging regarding labor, health and safety, fair trade, food safety, and
other areas.
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